









© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press for the Infectious Diseases 
Society of America. All rights reserved. For permissions, e-mail: 
journals.permissions@oup.com. 













Division of Infection and Global Health Research, School of Medicine, University of St Andrews, UK 
2
Department of Population Medicine, Harvard Medical School and Harvard Pilgrim Health Care Institute, USA 
3
Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics, Harvard TH Chan School of Public Health, USA 
4
College of Public Health, Kent State University, Kent, USA 
 
Author of correspondence: 
Name: Dr Muge Cevik 
Address: Division of Infection and Global Health Research, School of Medicine, University of St 
Andrews, Fife, KY16 9TF 
Telephone number: +447732800814 
Email address: mc349@st-andrews.ac.uk 
 
Summary: We argue that SARS-CoV-2 transmission dynamics should inform policy decisions about 
mitigation strategies for targeted interventions according to the needs of the society  
by directing attention to the settings, activities and socioeconomic factors  




















It is generally agreed that striking a balance between resuming economic and social activities and 
keeping the effective reproductive number (R0) below 1 using non-pharmaceutical interventions is an 
important goal until and even after effective vaccines become available. Therefore, the need remains 
to understand how the virus is transmitted in order to identify high-risk environments and activities 
that disproportionately contribute to its spread so that effective preventative measures could be put in 
place. Contact tracing and household studies in particular provide robust evidence about the 
parameters of transmission. In this viewpoint, we discuss the available evidence from large-scale, 
well-conducted contact tracing studies from across the world and argue that SARS-CoV-2 
transmission dynamics should inform policy decisions about mitigation strategies for targeted 
interventions according to the needs of the society by directing attention to the settings, activities and 
socioeconomic factors associated with the highest risks of transmission. 
 




















Since coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) was first described in December 2019, we have 
witnessed widespread implementation of local and national restrictions in many areas of the world, 
and social, health and economic devastation due to direct and indirect impact of the pandemic. It is 
generally agreed that striking a balance between resuming economic and social activities and keeping 
the effective reproductive number (R0) below 1 using non-pharmaceutical interventions is an 
important goal until and even after effective vaccines become available. Achieving this balance 
requires an understanding of how the virus is spread. There is also a need to identify the structural 
factors that contribute to transmission, a particular concern considering the already stark health 
disparities driven by socioeconomic and racial/ethnic inequities in our societies.  
 
An understanding of SARS-CoV-2 transmission dynamics can inform policy decisions by directing 
attention to the settings and activities that confer the highest risk of transmission and understanding of 
the intersection between poverty, household crowding, and COVID-19. This understanding will allow 
policymakers and public health practitioners to shape the best strategy, preventative measures and 
inform the public about transmission risk. Epidemiological investigations including contact tracing 
studies and outbreak investigations conducted so far across the world already provide crucial 
information about the probability of infection in close contacts and various environments. We argue 
that health authorities should use the large-scale, well-conducted contact tracing studies and 
observations from across the world to date in their risk assessment and mitigation strategies. This 
article summarizes current knowledge about transmission dynamics and discusses recommendations 




















Factors influencing transmission dynamics 
Emerging data suggests that risk of transmission depends on several factors, including contact pattern, 
host-related infectivity/susceptibility pattern, environment and socioeconomic factors (Figure 1). We 
will discuss the emerging evidence relating to each of these aspects of transmission.  
 
1- Contact pattern 
Contact tracing studies provide early evidence that sustained close contact drives the majority of 
infections and clusters. For instance, living with the case, family/friend gatherings, dining, or 
travelling on public transport were found to have a higher risk for transmission than market shopping 
or brief (<10 mins) community encounters [1-3]. While people are more likely to recall and disclose 
close and household contacts, and it is easier for tracers to identify the source, household studies 
provide important information about the contact patterns and activities associated with higher attack 
rates. Close contacts with the highest risk of transmission are typically friends, household members, 
and extended family, with a secondary attack rate that ranges from 4 to 35% [1, 4-8].  In the same 
household, higher attack rates are observed among spouses compared to the rest of the household [8]. 
In a systematic review including five studies based on relationship demonstrated that household SAR 
to spouses (43,4%; 95% CI: 27,1%–59,6%) was significantly higher than to other relationships 
(18,3%, 95% CI: 10,4%–26,2%) [8]. Similar results were observed in the USS Theodora Roosevelt 
outbreak in which those sharing the same sleeping space had higher risk of being infected [9]. In 
addition, the attack rate has shown to be higher when the index case is isolated in the same room with 
the rest of the household or when the household members have daily close contact with the index case 
[10, 11]. Transmission is significantly reduced when the index case is isolated away from the family, 
or preventative measures such as social distancing, hand hygiene, disinfection and use of face masks 
at home are applied [10, 11]. In a study of an outbreak in the largest meat processing plant in 
Germany, while the universal point of potential contact among all cases was workplace, positive rates 


















[12]. These findings suggest that sleeping in the same room or sharing the same sleeping space, 
increased contact frequency constitutes high risk of transmission. 
 
Large clusters have been observed in family, friend, work-colleague gatherings including weddings 
and birthday parties [13, 14]. Other examples include gatherings in pubs, church services, and close 
business meetings [14-17]. These findings suggest that group activities pose a higher risk of 
transmission. In non-household contact tracing studies, dining together or engaging in group activities 
such as board games have been found to be high risk for transmission as well [18]. In the same 
household, frequent daily contact with the index case, and dining in close proximity has been 
associated with increased attack rates [10, 11].  
 
Large, long-term care facilities such as nursing homes and homeless shelters have seen increased rates 
of infection, in part because of patterns of contact among staff and residents. In nursing home 
outbreak investigations from the Netherlands, Boston, and London, multiple viral genomes were 
identified, suggesting multiple introductions to the facility leading to infections among residents [19-
21]. In an investigation of 17 nursing homes that implemented voluntary staff confinement with 
residents, including 794 staff members and 1250 residents in France, staff confining themselves to a 
single facility for a weeklong period was associated with decreased outbreaks in these facilities [22].  
 
These findings emphasise that contact patterns, including the duration of contact, contact frequency, 
proximity to index case and types of activities influence transmission risk, highlighting the need for 



















2- Host factors 
Contact tracing and outbreak investigations suggest that many SARS-CoV-2-infected people either do 
not contribute to onward transmission or have minimal potential to do so [6, 17], and a large number 
of secondary cases are often caused by a small number of infected patients. While this may also be 
due to contact pattern and the environmental factors, host factors strongly influence this variation; 
individual variation in infectiousness is an expected feature of superspreading events.  
 
Timing of the contact with an index case is key in transmission dynamics as it relates to the 
infectiousness of the index case. In a living systematic review of studies published up to 6 June 2020, 
we found that viral load peaks early in the disease course, with the highest viral loads observed from 
symptom onset to day 5, indicating high level of infectiousness during this period [23] (Figure 2). 
Supporting these findings, transmission events are estimated to occur in a short window, likely a few 
days prior to and following symptom onset [4, 23]. For ex mple, a contact tracing study that followed 
up 2761 contacts of 100 confirmed COVID-19 cases demonstrated that infection risk was higher if the 
exposure occurred within the first five days after the symptom onset, with no secondary cases 
documented after this point [4]. This understanding indicates that viral dose plays an important role in 
transmission dynamics. In contrast, higher viral loads in SARS-CoV-1 and MERS-CoV were 
identified in the second week after symptom onset, suggesting that patients had viral load peak after 
hospitalisation [23]. Therefore, early viral load peak also explains efficient community SARS-CoV-2 
spread in contrast to SARS-CoV-1 and MERS-CoV during which community spread was put under 
control; however, nosocomial spread was an important feature of the outbreaks. In contrast during 
COVID-19, only a small number of hospital-based outbreaks have been reported so far, which may be 
due to downtrend viral load levels later in disease course [23, 24].  
 
Symptoms and severity of illness appear to influence transmission dynamics as well. People with 


















asymptomatic index cases (those who develop no symptoms throughout the illness) [18]. While 
asymptomatic patients can transmit the virus to others, the findings from nine studies in a systematic 
review, including studies published up to 3 July 2020, found secondary attack rates of zero to 2.8%, 
compared with secondary attack rates of 0.7% to 16.2% in symptomatic cases in the same studies, 
suggesting asymptomatiic index cases  transmit to fewer secondary cases [18]. Another systematic 
review that included studies published up to 10 June 2020 similarly found a reduced risk of 
transmission for asymptomatic versus symptomatic cases (0.35, 95% CI 0.10, 1.27) and pre-
symptomatic versus symptomatic cases (0.63, 95% CI 0.18, 2.26) [25]. There are also differences in 
attack rates based on symptom severity. In the Zhang et al. study the secondary attack rate was 3.5% 
for those with mild symptoms, 5.7% for those with moderate symptoms, and 4.5% for those with 
severe symptoms (based on CDC China guidelines) [26]. In a contact tracing study, contacts of severe 
cases were more likely to develop severe infections themselves [4]. 
 
Virus transmission is also affected by a number of other host factors, including host defense 
mechanisms, and age. Current synthesis of the literature demonstrates significantly lower 
susceptibility to infection for children aged under 10 years compared to adults given the same 
exposure, and elevated susceptibility to infection in adults aged over 60 years compared to younger or 
middle-aged adults [27].  
3- Environment 
Transmission risk is not one-dimensional and contact patterns also depend on the setting of the 
encounter. Findings from contact tracing studies in Japan suggest an 18.7-fold higher risk of 
transmission indoors compared with outdoor environments [28]. These findings are in keeping with 
our understanding about transmission patterns of respiratory viral infections. While outdoor settings 
usually have lower risk, prolonged contact in an enclosed setting can lead to increased risk of 
transmission. Especially when combined with environmental factors such as poor ventilation and 


















knowledge. SARS-CoV-2 is much more efficiently spread in enclosed and crowded environments. 
Largest outbreaks from across the world are reported in long term care facilities such as nursing 
homes, homeless shelters, prisons, and also workplaces including meat-packing plants and factories, 
where many people spend several hours working together, dining and sharing communal spaces [12, 
14]. In six London care homes experiencing SARS Cov-2 outbreaks identified a high proportion of 
residents (39.8%) and staff (20.9%) tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 [20]. Among 408 individuals 
residing at a large homeless shelter in Boston, 36% of those tested were found to be positive [16]. 
Although it is much harder to obtain data from incarcerated populations, the largest clusters of cases 
observed in the USA have all been associated with prisons or jails, suggesting a high attack rate in 
these institutional settings [29]. Social distancing is the opposite of incarceration, and overcrowding, 
poor sanitation and ventilation, and inadequate healthcare contribute to the disproportionate rates of 
infections seen in prisons and jails, which demonstrates the larger pattern of the health disparities in 
our societies. 
 
4- Socioeconomic factors and racial/ethnic disparities  
Global figures suggest that there is a strong association between socioeconomic deprivation, 
race/ethnicity and a higher risk of infection and death from COVID-19 [30, 31]. People facing the 
greatest socioeconomic deprivation experience a higher risk of household and occupational exposure 
to SARS-CoV-2, and existing poor health leads to more severe outcomes if infected [32]. People with 
lower-paid and public-facing occupations are often classified as essential workers who must work 
outside the home and may travel to work on public transport. Indeed, in New York City, higher 
cumulative infection rates were observed in neighbourhoods that continued to engage in mobility 
behaviours consistent with commuting for work [33].  These occupations often involve greater social 
mixing and greater exposure risk due to prolonged working hours, resulting in reduced ability to 
practice social distancing among low-income families [34]. In addition, households in 


















transmission within the household. Black, Hispanic, and other marginalised, racial/ethnic and migrant 
groups have also been shown to be at greater risk of infection, severe disease, and death from 
COVID-19 [31, 35-37]. These increased risks are also likely due to socioeconomic conditions that 
increase risk of transmission, inequitable access to adequate healthcare, and higher rates of 
comorbidities due to adverse living and working conditions and structural racism. It is not surprising 
that the largest outbreaks are observed in meat-packing plants, and most commonly exposed 
occupations include nurses, taxi and bus drivers and factory workers [31]. These disparities also shape 
the strong geographic heterogeneities observed in the burden of cases and deaths, for example across 
the USA and the UK [31, 38]. These findings support the hypothesis that the COVID19 pandemic is 
strongly shaped by structural inequities that drive household and occupational risks, emphasising the 
need to tailor effective control and recovery measures for these disadvantaged communities 
proportionate to their greater needs and vulnerabilities.  
 
5- Large clusters and superspreading events 
Clusters have become a prominent characteristic of SARS-CoV-2, which distinguishes it from 
seasonal influenza [14, 17]. This emphasises that large clusters and superspreading events may be the 
driver of the majority of infections, just as they were for SARS in 2002-2003 [39, 40]. For instance, 
during the 2003 SARS outbreak, over 70% of infections were linked to superspreading events in 
Hong Kong and Singapore [39]. Hallmarks for superspreading events include a combination of 
factors, typically a highly infectious individual(s) gathered with other individuals in enclosed and 
crowded environments [14, 17]. There have been several superspreading events reported so far. For 
example, an outbreak investigation from China identified that 24 out of 67 passengers were infected 
during a 50-minute return bus journey, which was linked to an index case who was symptomatic the 
day before the trip. In contrast, during the event, only six people were infected, all of whom were in 
close contact with the same index case [41]. In Washington state, a mildly symptomatic index case 


















probable secondary COVID-19 cases occurred with an attack rate of 53.3% to 86.7%) [42]. While 
these superspreading events occur, the frequency of these events and whether they are caused by a 
single index case are unclear. The modelling suggests that several independent introductions might be 
needed before a COVID-19 outbreak eventually takes off, meaning often these large outbreaks occur 
when multiple infected persons are introduced to the environment as shown in the nursing home 
investigation [43]. Other large outbreaks are reported in night clubs, karaoke bars, pubs [14, 17], 
which may be related to crowding, leading to multiple introductions into the same setting as seen in 
nursing home investigations. These findings and observations suggest that contact tracing 
investigations need to be combined with phylogenetic analysis to understand the settings and activities 
most likely to yield a superspreading event to inform preventative measures.  
 
Recommendations 
Increased risk of transmission in deprived areas and among people in low-paid jobs suggest that 
poverty and household crowding need to be addressed with interventions that go beyond guidance on 
social distancing, hand hygiene, and mask use. Previous research suggests that although social 
distancing during the 2009 H1N1 swine flu pandemic was effective in reducing infections, this effect 
was most pronounced in households with greater socioeconomic advantage. Similar findings are 
emerging for COVID-19, with the ability to practice social distancing strongly differentiated by 
county and household income [34]. The disproportionate impact of COVID-19 on households living 
in poverty, and the racial and ethnic disparities observed in many countries, emphasize the need to 
urgently address these inequities that directly impact health outcomes. This includes social and 
income protection and support to ensure low paid, non-salaried and zero-hours contract workers can 
afford to follow isolation and quarantine recommendations, provision of protective equipment for 
workplaces and community settings, appropriate return-to-work guidelines, and testing and 



















Second, knowing which contacts and settings confer the highest risk for transmission can help direct 
contact tracing and testing efforts to increase the efficiency of mitigation strategies. Early viral load 
peak in the disease course indicates that preventing onward transmission requires immediate self-
isolation with symptom onset, prompt testing and results with a 24-48 hours turnaround time, and 
robust contact tracing. In many countries, people with symptoms access testing late in the disease 
course, by which time they may have had multiple contacts while in the most infectious period. While 
self-isolation with symptoms is crucial, 75% of those with symptoms and their contacts in the UK 
reported not fully self-isolating [44]. While presymptomatic transmission likely contributes to a 
fraction of onward transmission, over half of transmission is caused by those with symptoms, 
especially in the first few days after symptom onset. These findings suggest that messages should 
prioritise isolation practice, and policies should include supported isolation and quarantine.  
 
Third, policy makers and health experts can help the public differentiate between lower-risk and 
higher-risk activities and environments and public health messages could convey a spectrum of risk to 
the public to support engagement in alternatives for safer interaction, such as in outdoor settings. 
Without clear public health communication about risk, individuals may fixate on unlikely sources of 
transmission —outdoor activities — while undervaluing higher-risk settings, such as family and 
friend gatherings, and indoor settings. Enhancing community awareness about risk can also encourage 
symptomatic persons and contacts of ill persons to isolate or self-quarantine to prevent ongoing 
transmission. 
 
Finally, because crowded, indoor spaces and gatherings likely will continue to be the driver of 
transmission, public health strategies will be needed to mitigate transmission in these settings, such as 
nursing homes, prisons and jails, shelters, meat-packing plants such as personal protective equipment 
and routine testing to identify infected individuals early in the disease course. As part of the pandemic 


















ventilation, just as improved sanitation was a response to cholera. Such strategies should be adopted 
in settings where large outbreaks and superspreading events have been identified by contact tracing 
studies.  
 
While modelling studies and computer simulations could contribute to our understanding of 
transmission dynamics and aero-dynamics of droplets, contact-tracing studies provide real-life 
transmission dynamics, individual and structural factors associated with SARS-CoV-2 transmission, 
which are essential to shape our public health plans, mitigate superspreading events, and control the 
current pandemic. Further understanding of transmission dynamics is also critical to developing 
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Figure 1: Factors influencing transmission dynamics 
Transmission depends on several factors, including contact pattern (duration of contact, gathering, 
proximity, activity), environment (outdoor, indoor, ventilation), host-related infectivity/susceptibility 
pattern (i.e. viral load in relation to disease course, severity of illness, age) and socioeconomic factors 
(i.e. crowded housing, job insecurity, poverty). Virus infectivity and differences between other 
viruses, and host immune factors are not discussed in this review. (This figure is created by the 
authors based on available literature about SARS-CoV-2 transmission dynamics) 
Figure 2: SARS-CoV-2 viral load dynamics and period of infectiousness 
Incubation period (time from exposure to symptom onset) 6 days (2-21 days), peak viral load levels 
documented from day 0 (symptom onset) to day5, infectious period starts before symptom onset up to 
10 days (this may be extended in patients with severe illness), RNA shedding continues for a 
prolonged period of time but culturable virus has been identified up to day 9 of illness. (This figure is 
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